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The paper explores the meaning of the principle of equal consideration of interests as expressed by the 
famous dictum that John Stuart Mill attributed to Jeremy Bentham: “everybody to count for one, nobody for more 
than one”. It examines the contributions of these two authors and the comments by Henry Sidgwick, Stanley W. 
Jevons, Francis Y. Edgeworth and Arthur C. Pigou. The hedonistic and cardinalistic assumptions that these 
authors shared made the question of how to weigh the happiness of different individuals crucial for the application 
of utilitarian ethics, since the distribution of happiness and the distribution of the means of happiness were strictly 
related in this perspective. In particular, the hedonistic approach suggested to Edgeworth a strong argument in 
favour of inequality, and a comparison of his conclusions with those of his predecessors – and with those of Pigou 
after him – is essential to understand the limits of the egalitarian implications of utilitarian ethics.  
 
 
After all, it would be of no much use to have all babies born from good stocks, 
if, generation after generation, they were made to grow up into bad men and 
women. A world of well-born, but physically and morally perverted, adults is 
not attractive. 
S. Webb, Eugenics Review, Nov. 1910, p. 236 
 
 
In chapter 5 of Utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill argued that the principle of utility “is a 
mere form of words without rational signification, unless one person’s happiness, supposed equal 
in degree [...], is counted for exactly as much as another’s. Those conditions being supplied, 
Bentham’s dictum, ‘everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one’  might be written 
under the principle of utility as an explanatory commentary”.144 The principle implied in this 
statement, often emancipated from its hedonistic attributes, is the principle of impartiality, or “the 
principle of equal consideration of interests”.145 
This paper aims at improving our understanding of the meaning and implications of this 
principle by studying its changing definitions from the age of Bentham to that in which the 
discussion on utilitarian ethics was turning the page from Henry Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics to 
George E. Moore’s Principia Ethica, while at the same time economic debate was dominated by 
Francis Y. Edgeworth, Alfred Marshall and Arthur Cecil Pigou. Such a description of the 
chronology reveals two essential characteristics of the paper: first, it waves between the history of 
moral philosophy and the history of economics; and second, it considers a period in which 
utilitarian ethics and economics were both strictly based on hedonistic and cardinalistic 
assumptions.146 The reason of this choice may be easily explained: the question of how to weigh 
the happiness of different individuals was crucial for both moral philosophers and economists 
who aimed at testing the validity of utilitarian ethics with a view to legal, political and economic 
                                                
144 Mill 1861a, p. 257. 
145 Singer 1993, p. 21. 
146 In other words, the authors herewith examined were convinced that the “greatest happiness” or “utility principle” 
required to maximise the total net amount of pleasure over pain of all people (or rather sentient beings) in society, 
and that pleasures and pains were homogeneously measurable quantities and could be aggregated across individuals.  
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applications, since there are essential connections, albeit not complete overlapping, between the 
distribution of happiness and the distribution of the means of happiness.147 But even the abandonment 
of hedonism – a question which is outside the scope of my inquiry – was the joint work of 
economists and philosophers, a fact which may reveal that distributive issues are at the core of 
utilitarian ethics.  
It is my contention that the questions raised in the paper are still appealing for 
contemporary debate regardless of the fact that we accept or reject cardinalism and hedonism as 
bases for utilitarian judgments.148 
But there is a special reason why the point of view of the authors mentioned above may 
regard our contemporary debate: as a matter of fact, the hedonistic approach suggested a strong 
argument in favour of serious limitations to the meaning and scope of the principle of equal 
consideration of interests, and the reasons provided to reject this argument may still be 
considered as valid grounds for an egalitarian interpretation of utilitarian ethics.  
As for the division of the paper, section 1 examines the case for an equal consideration of 
interests made by Bentham, Mill and Sidgwick, while section 2 discusses Edgeworth’s proposal of 
an inegalitarian version of utilitarianism; section 3 briefly reviews some reactions to this 
proposals, and the conclusions try to highlight some legacies of this evolution for contemporary 
debate. 
 
1. A Question of Taste: Egalitarian Hedonism 
There are reasons to trust John Stuart Mill for attributing to Bentham the “dictum” in its 
literal phrasing After all, the Solitary of Queen’s Square Place had been responsible for a large 
part of Mill’s intellectual education.149 But, as shown by Crimmins,150 the only passage in which 
the rule of impartiality is formulated in similar terms is in Rationale of Judicial Evidence, a work 
edited by young John Stuart under Bentham’s guidance.151 None the less, the rule as such is 
clearly implied in Bentham’s most known formulations of the Greatest Happiness Principle.152  
However, there is a manuscript written at the outburst of the French Revolution and 
partially published by Elie Halévy in 1901 under the title Essai sur la représentation,153 in which 
Bentham discussed this topic formulating an explicit rule of equal consideration of interests. 
Here Bentham, as he did elsewhere, introduces some “axioms”, i.e. “sort[s] of rule[s], of 
which by certain properties, the combination of which is peculiar to it, the usefulness is pre-
eminent in comparison with other rules”.154 The first of these “axioms” sounds like follows: 
I. Chacun a un droit égal à tout le bonheur dont sa nature est capable. 
                                                
147 Sidgwick 1962, p. 417n. 
148 The most known contemporary version of cardinalist utilitarianism is that propounded by John C. Harsanyi. See 
especially Harsanyi (1979). However, leaving aside other essential methodological and conceptual specificities, 
Harsanyi’s utilitarian criterion differs from classical utilitarianism on two essential points: it is rule-utilitarian rather 
than act-utilitarian, and it aims at maximising average rather than total utility. See also Adriani (2003). For a defence 
of classical hedonistic utilitarianism see Pontara (1998). 
149 A similar fate was reserved to another “dictum” quoted in his article on Bentham originally written in 1838: 
“quantity of pleasure being equal, push-pin is as good as poetry” (Mill 1838, p. 113). 
150 Crimmins, 2006. 
151 See Mill 1924, pp. 116-19. 
152 See, e.g., Bentham (1789a: ch. I, pp. 1-7; ch. IV, pp. 38-40); (1814-1831: ch. I.3, pp. 131-1). 
153 Bentham 1789b. 
154 Bentham 1838-1843, p. 215. More specifically, an “axiom of mental pathology” is defined as an empirical rule 
concerning behaviour, whose evidence is immediate and universal: “By an axiom of mental pathology, considered as 
a ground for a legislative arrangement, understand a proposition expressive of the consequences in respect of 
pleasure or pain, or both, found by experience to result from certain sorts of occurrences, and in particular from 
such in which human agency bears a part: in other words, expressive of the connexion between such occurrences as 
are continually taking place, or liable to take place, and the pleasures and pains which are respectively the result of 
them” (Bentham 1838-1843, p. 224). 
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Ou, pour dire la même chose en d’autres mots, et pour éviter l’obscurité qui s’attache à l’idée de 
droit, donné un assemblage quelconque d’hommes, un être indépendant supérieur quelconque, 
qui aurait assez de bonté pour s’intéresser à leur sort, pour trouver du plaisir dans l’idée de leur 
bien être sans avoir aucun intérêt personnel qui le porteroit à préferer quelqu’un d’entre eux à un 
autre, trouveroi [sic] naturellement un plaisir égal à contribuer au bonheur d’un quelconque 
entr’eux que d’un autre: le bonheur d’un quelconque entr’eux ne vaudroit pas mieux à ses yeux 
que le bonheur égal d’un autre quelconque: cependant un bonheur quelconque plus grand à 
recueillir par un quelconque entre eux vaudroit plus, à proportion de sa grandeur, qu’un bonheur 
moins grand à recueillir par un autre quelconque.155 
The (qualified) use of the natural rights paradigm is quite unusual in Bentham and must 
be explained as a rhetorical strategy to persuade an audience that overindulged in that language. 
More interesting, and less isolated, is Bentham’s attempt to translate these statements into 
utilitarian standards via the adoption of a Smithian “impartial spectator” or, in Bentham’s 
terminology, “observant bystander”.156 As Mill157 and Sidgwick158 later explained, the existence of 
moral sentiments – even in the more universal and reflexive version attributed to an ideal 
sympathetic spectator – is not a sufficient “proof” of the ethical principles incorporated in these 
sentiments.159 There is no reason to believe that Bentham was endeavouring to provide a meta-
ethical foundation of moral judgments. More probably, this was a further metaphorical expedient 
meant to stress the “axiomatic” or universal normative status of the principle of equal 
consideration of interests and its connection with the felicific calculus. 
More specifically, the passage quoted above stresses two important points:  
1. impartiality must be intended as anonymity or impersonality:160 in evaluating the 
happiness of different individuals it is not morally significant whose this happiness is; in 
other words, if it belongs to this or that individual;161 
2. impartiality also implies equal weight162 or equiproportionality: to equal needs or 
happiness equal consideration, to quantitatively different needs or happiness 
equiproportional consideration. 
The importance of this distinction is immediately revealed by Bentham’s second “axiom”. 
It is evident that a random inequality in particular states of happiness or unhappiness may depend 
on special external circumstances. To give an example, unequal thirst may depend on the actual 
                                                
155 Bentham 1879b, p. 315. Translation: “Every man has an equal right to all the happiness that his nature is capable 
of. 
Or to say the same thing in other words and to evade the obscurity which is attached to the idea of right: given any 
assemblage of men, any independent superior being who is benevolent enough to interest himself in their condition, 
and to find pleasure in the idea of their well-being without having any personal interest which would lead him to 
prefer one among them to another, will naturally find an equal pleasure in contributing to the happiness of any one 
among them as well as another. The happiness of any of them has no more value in his eyes than the equal 
happiness of any other. Nevertheless, any greater happiness obtained by any one among them has more value, in 
proportion to its quantity, than a lesser happiness obtained by another”. This and the following translations are 
based on Mack (1962, pp. 448-53) but modified where there was room for some improvement. The quoted passage 
is on p. 449. 
156 Bentham 1814-1831, p. 151n. 
157 Mill 1861a, p. 249. 
158Sigwick 1962, pp. 463-4. 
159 See Skorupski 1989, p. 285ff. 
160 Harsanyi 1977, p. 48. 
161 There is an obvious connection between anonymity and agent-neutrality, i.e. “the principle that a person’s good is, 
as it might be put, agent-neutrally good: that there is reason for everyone to promote it whether or not it is part of their 
good” (Skorupski 1989, p. 309). As Mill states in chapter 2 of Utilitarianism, “ [...] the happiness which forms the 
utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent’s own happiness, but that of all concerned. As 
between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested 
and benevolent spectator” Mill equates impartiality as agent-neutrality to “the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth” (Mill 
1861a, p. 218). 
162 Ibid. 
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(temporary or permanent) condition of different individuals on earth. In this case the utility 
principle, as specified by the impartiality rule, prescribes to give priority to those who are more 
thirsty. But what if there is a general inequality in individual capacities for pleasure? Bentham’s 
answer to this question is the following: 
II. Faute de pouvoir déterminer le degré relatif de bonheur dont differens individus sont 
susceptibles, il faut partir de la supposition que ce degré est le même pour tous. Cette supposition, 
si elle n’est pas exactement vraie, approchera au moins autant de la vérité, que toute autre 
supposition générale que l’on pourroit mettre à sa place.163 
The interpretation of this rule requires a preliminary explanation. Since according to the 
Greatest Happiness Principle a moral act is the one which maximises the happiness of all 
concerned sentient beings, the normative validity of the impartiality principle depends upon the 
truth of a descriptive statement about the capacity for pleasure of different individuals. This being 
granted, Bentham seems intentioned to ground the equal consideration of interests on a double 
assumption: 
1. it is difficult, if not impossible, to prove by consistent empirical evidence that different 
individuals or classes of individuals have unequal capacities for pleasure; 
2. (Occam’s razor): the supposition of equal capacity for pleasure is the simplest one and 
the best approximation to reality.164 
The second argument contains a clue to explaining Bentham’s crucial assumption on the 
equality of capacities. There is more than scepticism or pragmatism in it. In the manuscripts on 
the felicific calculus of the early 1780s partially published by Halévy,165 then integrally transcribed 
by David Baumgardt,166 and later in the chapter on “Circumstances influencing sensibility” of An 
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,167 Bentham underscores how different contexts 
affect the way in which individuals react to pleasures and pains of different kinds. This implies 
that some individuals are more sensible to pleasures and pains of certain qualities and others to 
pleasures and pains of other qualities.168 Applying Bentham’s theory of “dimensions”, this means 
that the intensity of pleasures and pains of different kinds varies from individual to individual, a 
notion that modern economics describes as subjectivity of tastes or heterogeneity of preferences. 
It is known that Bentham was acquainted with probability calculus but even though he did not 
express his contention employing the “Law of large numbers”, he considered that the best 
approximation to truth was to assume that sum for sum interpersonal qualitative differences 
balance out, so that the average intensity tends to be the same for all individuals. Therefore, 
                                                
163 Bentham 1789b, p. 315. Translation: “Lacking the power to determine the relative degree of happiness that 
different individuals are susceptible of, it is necessary to start with the assumption that the degree is the same for all. 
This assumption, if it is not exactly true, will more nearly approach the truth than any other general supposition 
which can be put in its place” (Mack 1962, p. 449). 
164 This second element is made clearer in a second formulation of the same axiom that is provided some lines 
below: “Chacun a un désir égal de bonheur: ou, bien qu’il se trouve à cet égard quelques différences, ces différences 
n’étant susceptibles d’aucune preuve ou mesure, ne sauroient se mettre en ligne de compte: et en tout cas, cette 
proposition générale se trouve plus approchante de la vérité qu’aucune autre que l’on pourroit mettre à sa place” 
(Bentham 1789b : 316). Translation: “Each has an equal desire of happiness. Or, although some differences were 
found in this respect, these differences, not being susceptible of any proof or measure [...] [cannot be drawn up in an 
account]. In any case, this general proposition is found approaching closer to the truth than any other which can be 
put in its place” (Mack 1962, p. 450). 
165 Halévy [1901-1903] 1995, I, p. 300-8. 
166 David Baumgardt 1952, p. 554-66. The manuscripts transcribed by Halévy and Baumgardt are in University 
College, London, Bentham Papers (hereinafter U.C.) XXVII, pp. 29-40. Douglas Long (1995) has demonstrated that 
they belong to an early unpublished work on ‘Critical Jurisprudence’ composed before IPML. 
167 Bentham 1789a, pp. 51-2. 
168 See Bentham (1814-1831, p. 130): “Quantity depends upon general sensibility, sensibility to pleasure and pain in 
general; quality upon particular sensibility: upon a man’s being more sensible to pleasure or pain from this or that 
source, than to ditto from this or that other”. 
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Bentham’s argument in favour of equality of capacities was based in the last resort on the 
hypothesis of indefinitely variable tastes. 
Not only did Bentham consider it difficult to prove and measure interpersonal differences 
in the “desire of happiness”, but he also based this view on the more radical complexity of 
understanding what is conducive to the well-being of different persons. In Deontology this point is 
stressed at length: while one’s own sensibility to diverse species of pleasure and pain can be 
known by introspection,169 at an interpersonal level there is no direct evidence of the quality of 
sensibility: there are only indirect signals offered by “countenance, gesture, deportment, 
contemporary conduct”, and, to a lesser but more deceiving extent, by “verbal account”.170 No 
exact conclusion on one’s pleasure can be drawn by analogy with what is pleasant to the 
observer, and no judgement on the propriety of another’s acts can be inferred from the 
psychological or preferential structure of the spectator.171 Thus Bentham is led to conclude that 
“every man is a better judge of what is conducive to his own well-being than any other man can 
be”,172 and also “the only proper judge”.173 
This might sound as a declaration of faith in ordinal utility, except that Bentham always 
insisted on the feasibility of hedonistic arithmetic. But a limitation did he introduce, and this was 
not dissimilar from what Mill would later affirm in On Liberty:174 it was an “absurdity”, claimed 
Bentham, “‘[...] in a case in which the agent himself were the only person whose well-being were 
in question, [... to] prescribe exactly the same line of conduct to be observed by every man”.175 
The felicific calculus should only be applied to “extra-regarding” matters, where it was necessary 
to solve essential social problems.  
This might adumbrate another practical reason for assuming equal capacities for pleasure: 
variability of tastes being given and impenetrable, assuming equality in this domain was the most 
straightforward way of reconciling utility with justice: every distribution of means should be made 
as if it affected every individual’s happiness in the same way. The burden of proof was then 
shifted on those who wanted to suggest another criterion. This point is clearly stated in a passage 
of the Principles of the Civil Code: 
 
General observation. – When the effect of a portion of wealth upon happiness is spoken of, it is 
always without reference to the sensibility of the particular individual, and the exterior 
circumstances, in which he may be placed. Difference of character is inscrutable; and there are no 
two individuals whose circumstances are alike. If these two considerations were not laid on one 
side, it would be impossible to form a single general proposition: but though each of these 
propositions may be found false or inexact in each particular case, it will neither militate against 
their speculative correctness, nor their practical utility. It is sufficient, – 1st, If they approach more 
nearly to the truth than any others which can be substituted for them; and, 2ndly, If they may be 
employed by the legislator, as the foundation of his labours, with less inconvenience than any 
others.176 
 
To sum up, we are left with three arguments in favour of equal consideration of interests: 
1. difficulty of ascertaining hedonic differences; 
2. simplicity and approximation to truth; 
3. feasibility and practical necessity of felicific calculus. 
                                                
169 “[...] it may be known by the most impressive and infallible of all direct evidence, the evidence of a man’s own 
senses” (Bentham 1814-1831, p. 130). 
170 Bentham 1814-1831, p. 130. 
171 Ibid., pp. 150-1. This might sound as a criticism of Smith’s mechanism of interpersonal knowledge based on 
sympathy. 
172 Ibid., p. 131. 
173 Ibid., p. 150. 
174 Mill, On Liberty (1859). 
175 Ibid., p. 131. 
176 Bentham 1801, p. 305. 
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Moreover, as the last quotation reveals, there is an evident connection between equal 
consideration of happiness and the distribution of the means of happiness. This connection is 
already intimated in Essai sur la représentation. Here Bentham discusses three typical problems that 
were at the core of the utilitarian debate for the two centuries to come: 1. how to evaluate 
alternative distributions yielding the same total utility; 2. the optimum population according to 
utilitarian ethics;177 and 3. the relationship between decreasing marginal utility and distributive 
equality.178 
These questions are also discussed in chapter six of Principles of the Civil Code, devoted to 
“Propositions of pathology upon which the advantage of equality is founded”, and in a later text 
entitled Pannomial Fragments.179 Using a language that was not Bentham’s, his arguments in favour 
of equality might be expressed as follows: 
1. preferences are continuous: “Each portion of wealth is connected with a corresponding 
portion of happiness”.180 
2. preferences are additive or monotonic, and interpersonally comparable: “Of two 
individuals, possessed of unequal fortunes, he who possesses the greatest wealth will 
possess the greatest happiness”.181 
3. utility is decreasing at the margin: “The excess of happiness on the part of the most 
wealthy will not be so great as the excess of his wealth”.182 
4. maximum total utility corresponds to perfect equality of distribution: “The more nearly 
the actual proportion approaches to equality, the greater will be the total mass of 
happiness”.183 
However, there is an important difference between the case in which equal distribution is 
spontaneously attained and another in which artificial re-distributions are performed. Dealing 
with the latter case, Bentham starts considering the case of equal fortunes: in such a situation, the 
distribution that leaves the status quo unchanged is the one which maximises happiness. This in 
turn depends on three distinct axioms, which could be formulated as follows: 
5. given decreasing marginal utility, modifying an equal distribution diminishes total utility. 
This fact is simply due to the slope of the utility curve: “The sum lost, bearing a greater 
proportion to the reduced fortune than to the increased fortune, the diminution of 
happiness for the one will be greater than the increase of happiness to the other”.184 
                                                
177 The example made by Bentham is the following: ten units of pleasure distributed over ten individuals are equal to 
the same ten units divided between five individuals: “autant vaudroit prendre le sort pour arbitre, que de décider de 
toute autre manière” (Bentham 1789b, p. 316). Translation: “It is as valuable to take chance as an arbiter, as to decide 
in any other way” (Mack 1962, p. 450). We see how the elements of the so-called “repugnant conclusion” are already 
implicit in this reasoning. 
178 “Mais, dans la production de bonheur, de quelle cause qu’il s’agisse (sic), la quantité de l’effet n’est guère 
proportionnelle à celle de la cause: une quantité double de la cause de bonheur ne produira pas une quantité double 
de bonheur, mais beaucoup moins” (Ibid.). Translation : “But in the production of happiness, whatever is the cause 
in question, the quantity of the effect is never proportional to the cause: a double quantity of the cause of happiness 
will not produce a double quantity of happiness, but much less”. 
179 Bentham 1838-1843. On these aspects of Bentham’s thought see Parekh (1970), Griffin-Collart (1974, pp. 44-92) 
and Kelly (1990). 
180 Bentham 1801, p. 305. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Ibid. See also Bentham 1838-1843, pp. 228-9. 
183 Ibid. Interestingly, Bentham remarks that these propositions should be intended in probabilistic terms. For 
example: “We have said, each portion of wealth is connected with a corresponding portion of happiness: strictly 
speaking, it should have been, has a certain chance of being so connected. The efficacy of any cause of happiness is 
always precarious; in other words, a cause of happiness may not produce its ordinary effect; nor the same effect 
upon every individual. It is here that it is necessary to apply what has been said with respect to particular sensibility 
and character, and the variety of circumstances in which they may be found” (Bentham 1801, p. 305). The last part 
of this quotation strengthens my interpretation that Bentham had a probabilistic view of the idea that interpersonal 
qualitative differences in intensity balance out. 
184 Ibid., p. 307. 
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6. a distinct pain of disappointment is added to the direct loss of happiness: “The loser 
experiences the pain of disappointed expectation: the other is simply in the condition of 
not having gained. But the negative evil of not having gained, is not equal to the positive 
evil of having lost”.185 
7. finally, for equal amounts, sensibility to pain is higher than sensibility to pleasure: 
“Mankind in general appear to be more sensible of grief than pleasure from an equal 
cause. For example a loss which would diminish the fortune of an individual by one 
quarter, would take more from his happiness than would probably be added by a gain 
which should double it”.186  
The case of unequal distribution – if the loser is the richer – is obviously more 
controversial since the positive effects on total utility generated by re-distribution may 
compensate or not the pain of disappointment connected to the loss of wealth.187 Moreover, two 
additional evils, defined “of second” and “third order”, regularly add themselves to the pain of 
disappointment: the “fear of loss” (elsewhere called “alarm”), and the “destruction of 
industry”,188 i.e. the negative incentive on laboriousness and entrepreneurship generated by fear. 
These are the reasons why security of person and property has a priority over equality as a 
“subordinate end of government” in Bentham’s thought.189 
Since a state of perfect equality cannot be attained, Bentham claims that the goal of 
government should be a society “in which, while the fortune of the richest – of him whose 
situation is at the top of the scale, is greatest, the degrees between the fortune of the least rich 
and that of the most rich are most numerous, – in other words, the gradation is most regular and 
insensible”.190 In such a situation, if some redistributions of wealth are required by extraordinary 
circumstances, the relatively high income of a large middle class affords a substantial reserve 
from which resources can be drawn, and at the same time there are less poor families to be 
                                                
185 Ibid. 
186 Ibid. It may be noticed that this third axiom is dropped in Pannomial Fragment and in other formulations of the 
“axioms of mental pathology” (see Bentham 1838-1843, pp. 229-30). An explanation might be that this seem an ad 
hoc hypothesis difficult to justify with empirical evidence. Another explanation is that Bentham wants to avoid the 
pessimistic conclusions that are connected to such an asymmetry. This is made clear by a footnote immediately 
following the last quotation: “It does not follow that the sum of evil is greater than that of good. Not only is evil 
more rare, but it is accidental: it does not arise, like good, from constant and necessary causes. Up to a certain point, 
also, it is in our power to repulse evil from, and attract good to, ourselves. There is also in human nature a feeling of 
confidence in happiness, which prevails over the fear of its loss: this is evidenced by the success of lotteries” 
(Bentham 1801, p. 307n.). 
187 Ibid. It is interesting to observe that the whole reasoning rests upon a rigorous theory of value based on subjective 
utility that is at odds with Smith’s and Ricardo’s labour approach. This theory is explicitly stated in the Pannomial 
fragments, where Bentham, after repeating Smith’s distinction between use “value in the way of exchange” (also called 
“general value”) and “value in the way of use” (also defined “special, or say idiosyncratical” value) (Bentham 1838-
1843, p. 226), not only ground value on utility (“Note, that the value of the thing in the way of exchange arises out 
of, and depends altogether upon, and is proportioned to, its value in the way of use”, Ibid.), but also specifies that he 
is referring to a subjective notion of utility (“Be the modification of the matter of prosperity what it may, by losing it 
without an equivalent, a man suffers according to, and in proportion to, the value of it in his estimation – the value by 
him put upon it”, Ibid. our italics). This is consistent with is assumption that individuals are the only judges of the 
preferences they have (consumer’s sovereignty). Significantly, in this context subjectivity is connected to an implicit 
Marshallian notion of “consumer’s rent” based on disposition to pay, expressed in the traditional way of a distinction 
between average price and individual surplus price: “But value in the way of use may be distinguished into general, 
which has place so far as, and no further than, the thing is of use to persons in general – and special or idiosyncratical, 
which has place insofar as, in the case of this or that person in particular, the thing has a value in the way of use over 
and above the value which it has in the case of persons in general: of which use, that of the pretium affectionis, the value 
of affection, is an example” (Ibid.).  
188 Ibid., p. 310. 
189 Ibid., pp. 307-8; Bentham 1838-1843, pp. 225-7. These limitations are underscored by Sidgwick, who argues that 
distributive equality would be “fatal to the other factor of the utilitarian end, quantity of wealth”. See Edgeworth 
(1891b, p. 17). 
190 Bentham 1838-1843, p. 230. 
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nourished.191 We see that, applying the felicific calculus to equality, Bentham comes close to a 
rigorous mathematical measure of inequality. 
To conclude with, Bentham distinguishes between equal consideration of happiness and 
equality of the means of happiness, but it is important to remember that the utilitarian ceteris 
paribus case for distributive equality entirely relies on the assumption of equal capacity for 
happiness. Only under this assumption, equality maximises happiness. Indeed, the case of 
unequal distribution of wealth is a clear example of the property of equiproprotionality, as in this 
case the needs of the relatively poor count proportionally more than those of the relatively rich.  
But distributive equality is just one of the inferences derived from the principle of equal 
consideration of interests. In Essai sur la représentation Bentham deals with the problem of the 
extent of suffrage. In Bentham’s own words: 
 
Ainsi, dût-il ne s’agir que de s’en rapporter au degré de désir, si la capacité de juger de la 
tendance d’une opération d’ajouter au bonheur étoit dans tous égale à leur désir, la question de 
la meilleure forme de gouvernement serait une affaire bien simple. Il ne s’agiroit que de donner 
[...] à chaque individu de cette société un vote.192 
 
The rest of the essay discusses the limitations to this rule concerning minors, the insane 
and, though with some hesitation, women.193 But limitations concern the capacity to judge about 
one’s own happiness, not the capacity for happiness, which by assumption is the same in all. 
Therefore, exceptions excepted, the rule to give to every person one vote derives from the 
assumption of (probabilistic) equal sensibility to pleasure and pain. 
Such an enlarged view of the principle of impartiality is also revealed by Bentham’s 
doctrine of the “subordinate ends of legislation”, i.e., security, subsistence, abundance and 
equality.194 Bentham remarks that there are many objects of distributive justice, including not only 
the matter of wealth, but also power, reputation, and condition in life.195 Additionally, he bases 
the axioms concerning the most important end of government, security, on the properties of 
anonymity and equiproportionality. Most of the hedonistic asymmetries introduced to this 
effect196 – some of which actually amount to ad hoc assumptions – are indeed required to establish 
a just proportion between punishment and offence. The general rule to which this matter must 
be subjected is the following: 
 
For justification of the legislative arrangements necessary to afford security against maleficent acts 
affecting the person, what it is necessary to show is, that by them pain will not be produced in 
such quantity as will cause it to outweigh the pleasure that would have been produced by the 
maleficent acts so prevented.197 
 
Bentham, with Beccaria in mind, is here fixing a principle similar to what Gary Becker 
later put at the centre of his economic theory of punishment: from the point of view of social 
welfare, “‘[o]ptimal’ decisions are interpreted to mean decisions that minimize the social loss in 
                                                
191 Here, however, the goal of redistributive policies is subsistence – another of Bentham's “subordinate ends of 
government – rather than equality”. 
192 Bentham 1879b, p. 316. Translation: “Thus, were it only a question of the degree of desire and if the capacity of 
judging the tendency of an addition to happiness were in all men equal to their desire, the question of the best form 
of government would be a very simple affair. It would only be a matter of giving each individual in this society a 
vote” (Mack 1962, p. 450).  
193 See Campos Boralevi (1984), ch. 2. 
194 As it is known, they are subordinate vis-à-vis the general end, the greatest happiness of all. 
195 Bentham 1838-1843, p. 225. 
196 They concern, for example, the difference between pains of disappointment and of personal physical and mental 
sufferings, pains connected to reputation and condition in life, on one hand, and pleasures of acquisition, of 
antipathy or revenge, of sexual satisfaction, etc., on the other (Bentham 1838-1843, p. 226). 
197 Ibid., p. 226. 
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income from offenses. This loss is the sum of damages, costs of apprehension and conviction, 
and costs of carrying out the punishments imposed”.198 
The axioms concerning security raise a final question concerning Bentham’s approach to 
impartiality. If the asymmetries between certain kinds of pleasure were universal, then it could 
happen that some groups of population (the criminals in particular) are less capable of pleasure 
than others. Consider the case of a sexual maniac who takes pleasure exclusively from harassing 
and raping women. If Bentham’s axioms are statements about facts, this implies that a maniac is 
constitutionally less capable of pleasure than “ordinary” people. A possible explanation is that 
since sexual mania is a form of insanity, if an individual affected by it could be cured, he would 
enjoy a happier life than at present. However the same cannot be said of any kind of criminal 
acts, most of which are deliberately carried out by perfectly rational persons and occupy a 
primary place in their life. Therefore, while, as stated above, ordinary subjective differences in 
sensibility to certain types of pleasures and pains compensate themselves overall, producing an 
equal capability of happiness, some types of pleasure are axiomatically inferior, and those who 
systematically cultivate them are de facto less capable of happiness than others. Bentham seems to 
realise that this assumption is problematic, as he immediately adds that it is not necessary to 
postulate unequal sensibilities: rather, “in order to complete the proof, and render it objection-
proof, in certain cases, it will be necessary to take into account not only the evil of the first order, 
but the evil of the second and likewise”.199 But so far as some axioms postulate a general 
difference of intensity, the contradiction cannot be eliminated. The only possible explanation is 
that these axioms are implicitly normative and postulate that social and semi-social ways of life 
should count more from an utilitarian point of view than anti-social ones. There are some 
similarities between this interpretation and the way in which Harsanyi (1986) excludes anti-social 
preferences from his social welfare function. 
 
Let us now turn to John Stuart Mill. His analysis of the rule of impartiality is developed in 
a chapter of Utilitarianism devoted to the “Connection between Justice and Utility”. Differently 
from Bentham, who insists that the only clear definition of rights, and correspondingly of justice, 
is the legal one,200 Mill tries to provide a more general definition consistent with utilitarian ethics. 
Mill moves from the question of what distinguishes justice from other provinces of morality, and 
the answer is provided by adopting the scholastic distinction between perfect and imperfect 
rights.201 Both are moral rights, but the former refer to assignable persons to which a definite 
action is due, whereas the latter are not exactly defined in terms of persons concerned and time 
of execution. Therefore “the idea of justice supposes two things; a rule of conduct, and a 
sentiment which sanctions the rule [...] There is involved, in addition, the conception of some 
definite person who suffers by the infringement; whose rights [...] are violated by it”.202  
But a consistent justification of the moral duty of justice is only provided by the Greatest 
Happiness Principle. “To have a right, then, is, I conceive, to have something which society 
                                                
198 Becker 1968, p. 207. 
199 Ibid. 
200 See for example the following passages: “What is true is, that from the beginning of things it has always been 
desirable that rights should exist – and that because they do not exist; since, so long as there are no rights, there can 
only be misery upon the earth – no sources of political happiness, no security for person, for abundance, for 
subsistence, for equality” (Bentham 1838-1843, p. 219). And again: “Rights are, then, the fruits of the law, and of the 
law alone. There are no rights without law – no rights contrary to the law – no rights anterior to the law. Before the 
existence of laws there may be reasons for wishing that there were laws – and doubtless such reasons cannot be 
wanting, and those of the strongest kind; - but a reason for wishing that we possessed a law, does not constitute a 
right. To confound the existence of a reason for wishing that we possessed a right, with the existence of the right 
itself, is to confound the existence of a want with the means of relieving it. It is the same as if one should say, 
everybody is subject to hunger, therefore everybody has something to eat” (Ibid., p. 221). 
201 Donner 1991. 
202 Mill 1861a, p. 249-50. 
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ought to defend me in the possession of. If the objector goes on to ask, why it ought? I can give 
him no other reason than general utility”.203 However, from an utilitarian point of view, justice is 
by far the principal part of morality: 
 
While I dispute the pretensions of any theory which sets up an imaginary standard of justice not 
grounded on utility, I account the justice which is grounded on utility to be the chief part, and 
incomparably the most sacred and binding part, of all morality. Justice is a name for certain 
classes of moral rules, which concern the essentials of human well-being more nearly, and are 
therefore of more absolute obligation, than any other rules for the guidance of life.204 
 
Then Mill proceeds to prove that all definitions of justice that had been given up to then 
– justice as legal right, moral right, desert, impartiality, equality – can only be made consistent by 
applying the utilitarian standard. As to impartiality, arguing that it is insufficient to definite justice, 
Mill remarks that it is not independent but instrumental to other, more fundamental duties,205 and 
that there are cases in which it is right to violate it. “Impartiality, in short, as an obligation of 
justice, may be said to mean, being exclusively influenced by the considerations which it is 
supposed ought to influence the particular case in hand; and resisting the solicitation of any 
motives which prompt to conduct different from what those considerations would dictate”.206 
When he comes to define impartiality in terms of utility, however, Mill proceeds in a sort of 
crescendo, arguing first that it is instrumental to other duties – such as to protect an individual against 
“wrongful aggression” and “wrongfully withholding from him something which is his due”, or to 
do to each according to his or her desert207 – then that it is a corollary to the more fundamental 
rules of justice, and finally that it is “the highest abstract standard of social and distributive justice” 
(ibid.: 257, our italics). So far, impartiality is an attribute of that province of morality that Mill 
defines as justice. 
Following an ascending line, however, Mill then adds that “this great moral duty rests 
upon a still deeper foundation, being a direct emanation from the first principle of morals, and 
not a mere logical corollary from secondary or derivative doctrines. It is involved in the very 
meaning of Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle”.208 This implies that impartiality 
becomes a rule of morality in general, applied to duties of both perfect and imperfect obligation: 
every application of the Utility Principle must then be submitted to it. 
 
It is at this point that appears the passage quoted at the beginning of this paper: 
That principle is a mere form of words without rational signification, unless one person’s 
happiness, supposed equal in degree (with the proper allowance made for kind), is counted for 
exactly as much as another’s.209 
 
With one notable exception, this definition reminds that of Bentham:  
1. the argument that “one person’s happiness [...] is counted for exactly as much as another’s” 
expresses the property of anonymity. This property is considered by Mill, who quotes 
Kant (Mill 1861a: 249), a prerequisite of the universal character of a moral rule.  
                                                
203 Ibid., p. 250. 
204 Ibid., p. 255. 
205 See Crisp 1997, p. 161. 
206 Ibid., p. 243. 
207 “If it is a duty to do to each according to his deserts, returning good for good as well as repressing evil by evil, it 
necessarily follows that we should treat all equally well (when no higher duty forbids) who have deserved equally well 
of us, and that society should treat all equally well who have deserved equally well of it, that is, who have deserved 
equally well absolutely” (Mill 1861a, p. 257). 
208 Ibid. 
209 Ibid. 
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2. The proviso ‘supposed equal in degree’ introduces the characteristic of 
equiproportionality. 
3. Only the third element is absent in Bentham: Mill adds that “proper allowance” must be 
made also “for kind”. This introduces into the definition of equal consideration of 
interests Mill’s distinction between pleasures of different qualities. Consideration of this 
distinction implies that between equal pleasures the rule of consideration is equality, 
whereas between pleasures of different quality a rule of hierarchy must be imposed. It may 
be observed that in Mill’s careful definition the “proper allowance made for kind” is a 
specification of the rule of equiproportionality, stipulating that where there are qualitative 
discontinuities, the proportion between the quantitative intensity of pleasures is no longer a 
valid criterion of assessment.  
The problems raised by Mill’s qualitative approach to pleasures and pains have recently 
been the subject of a lively debate.210 As known, the question is discussed in chapter 2 of 
Utilitarianism, where Mill maintains that: “It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to 
recognise the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than 
others”.211 Among these pleasures, Mill mentions “the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings 
and imagination, and of the moral sentiments”.212 The following is the explanation of what 
constitutes a superior pleasure according to Mill: 
 
If I am asked, what I mean by difference of quality in pleasures, or what makes one pleasure more 
valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, except its being greater in amount, there is but one 
possible answer. Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience 
of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is 
the more desirable pleasure. If one of the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with 
both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with 
a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure 
which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a 
superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small 
account.213 
 
The competent judges of the value of these “superiorities” are those who have 
experienced both kinds of pleasures.214 
It is known that Mill did not identify those who are able to enjoy superior pleasures with 
a privileged elite, and his social and political vision aimed at promoting the self-development of 
humanity throughout society by means of popular education215 and liberal-democratic 
institutions.216 Nevertheless, if we take the principle of equal consideration from a static point of 
view, the quality-quantity distinction leaves only the property of anonymity untouched. Other 
things being equal, those who enjoy higher pleasures must be more considered by the utilitarian 
spectator. But the question is just how far other things may be equal, at least if we take the 
standard interpretation that higher pleasures are incommensurably superior to lower pleasures: from 
relative, the preference for those who feel higher pleasures becomes then absolute. Mill never 
falls in such a pitfall, and it would be an error to see the contemporary proposal of plural vote, 
advanced in Considerations on Representative Government,217 as an application of an elitist conception. 
                                                
210 See Donner (1991); Long (1992); Riley (1993); Scarre (1997); Riley (1999); Ryberg (2002); Rabinowicz (2003); 
Arrhenius and Rabinowicz (2005); Jensen (2006). 




215 See Mill 1848, IV.iv. 
216 See Mill 1861b. 
217 See Mill 1861b, ch. 8. 
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But the question of the theoretical consistency between impartiality and “Millian superiorities” 
still remains unsettled.  
Moreover, like Bentham, Mill insists that the principle of impartiality, restated in 
utilitarian terms, necessarily implies “an equal claim to all the means of happiness, except in so far 
as the inevitable conditions of human life, and the general interest, in which that of every 
individual is included, set limits to the maxim; and those limits ought to be strictly construed”.218 
Strangely enough, however, Mill reverts to define this “claim” as a “maxim of justice”, instead of 
considering it, as Bentham had done, a more general “subordinate end” applicable to all branches 
of utilitarian morality, including beneficence and welfare policies. This however is the only 
passage in which Mill discusses the connection between equal consideration and substantive 
equality. In Utilitarianism there is no extended analysis of the relationship between the Greatest 
Happiness Principle and equality that may be compared to the one Bentham had developed.219 
Conversely, both authors stress in similar ways the limitations that the security of person and 
property sets to the applicability of redistributive actions. 
 A final question discussed by Mill is whether the principle of equal consideration of 
interests represents an independent moral rule or, as he expresses himself, an “explanatory 
commentary” to the Greatest Happiness Principle. In a footnote he criticises Spencer for having 
argued that the Utility Principle is an insufficient foundation of morality since it presupposes the 
anterior norm “that everybody has an equal right to happiness”. Mill objects that impartiality is 
implicit in the Greatest Happiness Principle, and consequently the rule is one:220  
 
It may be more correctly described as supposing that equal amounts of happiness are equally 
desirable, whether felt by the same or by different persons. This, however, is not a pre-
supposition; not a premise needful to support the principle of utility, but the very principle itself; 
for what is the principle of utility, if it be not that “happiness” and “desirable” are synonymous 
terms?221 
 
It is worth observing, in the light of what will follow, that the pseudo-Benthamite dictum 
“everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one” is equivalent for Mill to the statement 
that “equal amounts of happiness are equally desirable”, independently from their actual carriers.  
A limit of Mill’s analysis compared to Bentham is that he does not take a clear stand on the 
question whether there exist different capacities for pleasure. But there are no reasons to think 
that he agreed with such a supposition. Nevertheless, a clear statement in favour of equal 
capacities would have helped, since assuming Mill’s qualitative approach this kind of inequalities 
cannot be a priori discarded. What is less clear, in this case, is how far the principle that everybody 
should count for one can be entirely deduced from the principle of utility instead of representing 
an independent (or additional) normative assumption stipulating that, whatever differences in 
capacity may arise, they must not be taken into account. 
 
The nature of the principle of impartiality is also examined in book 4, chapter 1 of Henry 
Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics (1st edition 1874)222, which is considered the most sophisticated 
systematisation of classical hedonistic utilitarianism. After defining utilitarian ethics as 
“universalistic hedonism”, and distinguishing it from “egoistic hedonism”, Sidgwick discusses 
two classical questions raised by the Greatest Happiness Principle. The first is the question of 
                                                
218 Mill 1861a, p. 258. 
219 Griffin-Collart 1974, p. 137-40. 
220 This point is stressed by Dryer (1969, xciv-xcv). 
221 Mill 1861a, p. 258n. 
222 We will quote here from the 7th edition of 1962, which is identical to the 6th edition, the last published by the 
author. 
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optimum population. Avoiding the problem of the so-called “repugnant conclusion”,223 Sidgwick 
argues that: “Assuming then, that the average happiness of human beings is a positive quantity, it 
seems clear that, supposing the average happiness enjoyed remains undiminished, Utilitarianism 
directs us to make the number enjoying it as great as possible”.224  
Then Sidgwick discusses the question of the ‘distribution of happiness”, distinguishing it, 
as mentioned above, from the distribution of the “means of happiness”. His interpretation recalls 
Spencer’s argument criticised by Mill: instead of considering the principle of equal consideration 
of interests as a consequence of the Utility Principle, Sidgwick sees it as one of its limitations. “It 
is evident”, he says, “that there may be many different ways of distributing the same quantum of 
happiness among the same number of persons”.225 And such a case is not infrequent because – as 
Sidgwick argues in book 2, chapters 2 and 3 – it is often impossible to measure happiness in an 
exact way and we use approximations in which small differences fade away. Formulated in this 
way, the question cannot be answered from within the utilitarian principle, which only prescribes 
to maximise total utility independently of its distribution. Then Sidgwick concludes that “at least 
we have to supplement the principle of seeking the greatest happiness on the whole by some 
principle of Just or Right distribution of this happiness”.226 But what principle should be 
adopted? Sidgwick answers as follows: 
 
The principle which most Utilitarians have either tacitly or expressly adopted is that of pure 
equality – as given in Bentham’s formula, “everybody to count for one, and nobody for more 
than one”. And this principle seems the only one which does not need a special justification; for, 
as we saw, it must be reasonable to treat any one man in the same way as any other, if there be no 
reason apparent for treating him differently.227 
 
Here Sidgwick relies on the simplicity argument already adopted by Bentham. In his case, 
however, it is not the factual statement about the equal capacity for pleasure that is concerned, 
but the normative principle of the equal consideration of interests as such. To the question 
whether there are two principles or only one, Sidgwick answers then in favour of the first 
alternative, thus advocating a sort of “extended utilitarianism”.228 
However, in chapter 3 Sidgwick provides a less clear-cut account of the principle of 
impartiality. The problem considered here is that of the “distribution of beneficence”. Sidgwick 
reacts to Grote’s (1870) critique of the Utility Principle, charged of “rigid impartiality” for 
equating the duty of assisting friends and relatives to that of relieving a stranger.229 According to 
Sidgwick, there is an essential distinction between the “ultimate end” and the “the rules of 
conduct by which this end will be attained”: the latter may prescribe in some cases an unequal 
treatment of different persons. But what interests us is the definition of the rule of impartiality 
that follows: 
 
                                                
223 Parfit 1984. 
224 Sidgwick 1962, p. 415. More precisely the rule to apply is the following: “So that, strictly conceived, the point up 
to which, on Utilitarian principles, population ought to be encouraged to increase, is not that at which average 
happiness is the greatest possible, – as appears to be often assumed by political economists of the school of Malthus 
– but that at which the product formed by multiplying the number of persons living into the amount of average 
happiness reaches its maximum” (Sidgwick 1962, pp. 415-16). See Edgeworth (1891b, pp. 18-19) for a sympathetic 
comment to this doctrine. 
225 Ibid., p. 416. 
226 Ibid., pp. 416-17. This point of view is shared by Crisp (1997, pp. 167-71), who argues that the Utility Principle 
should be integrated by a principle of fairness. 
227 Ibid., p. 417. 
228 Brandt 1959, pp. 403-5 and 429-31; Hospers 1951, pp. 426-9; Raphael 1981, pp. 47-56. 
229 On the problem of integrity and the separateness of persons implied in this objection see Crisp (1997, ch. 6). 
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[...] Bentham’s dictum may be understood merely as making the conception of the ultimate end 
precise – laying down that one person’s happiness is to be counted for as much as another’s 
(supposed equal in degree) as an element of the general happiness – not as directly prescribing the rules 
of conduct by which this end will be attained.230 
 
This definition, besides containing the properties of anonymity and equiproportionality, 
subordinates the principle of impartiality to the Utility Principle. However, subordinating does 
not imply establishing an identity between the two principles, and Sidgwick does not say how 
such a subordination should be established or, in other words, what is the rule that connects the 
two principles in an unequivocal way.231 
Moreover, it is reasonable to contend that this conclusion strictly depends on the peculiar 
way in which Sidgwick formulates the question. And this formulation reveals how difficult it is, 
from an utilitarian point of view, to keep the analysis of the distribution of happiness separated 
from that of the means of happiness. Let us start from Sidgwick’s case: the total amount of 
happiness is given and can be distributed in different ways, and that the number of individuals is 
fixed. Let us also assume that the capacity for pleasure is equal in all persons.232 Finally, the 
Greatest Happiness Principle is the principle we adopt to guide our actions. Under these 
assumptions, only the amounts of total utility which maximise it are significant. Let us consider 
one of these amounts: this was generated by a redistribution of the means of happiness with a 
view to maximising utility. If the means were equally distributed, the degrees of happiness were 
already equal and no redistribution was required. If they were unequally distributed, the degrees 
of happiness were also unequal ad the redistribution not only maximises happiness but it also 
equalizes it. Therefore, ceteris paribus, any general equilibrium consistent with the Utility Principle 
is generated by redistributing the means of happiness until happiness is equally distributed. If the 
capacity for pleasure is the same in all individuals, it is then impossible to reach a maximum total 
utility that does not correspond to equal distribution of happiness. Mill was therefore right in 
arguing that the principle of equal consideration of interests descends from the Greatest 
Happiness Principle and is not an additional rule of justice. 
It is true that, as Sidgwick argues, a given amount of happiness can be differently 
distributed among the same number of individuals, but only one of the following alternatives is 
available: either these distributions are is justified adopting another rule than general happiness, 
or there exist observable psychological conditions that justify an unequal distribution of 
happiness. This, as we shall see, is the solution chosen by Edgeworth assuming unequal capacities 
for pleasure. 
 
                                                
230 Sidgwick 1962, p. 432, our italics. 
231 See Pontara 1998, pp. 172-4. 
232 Sidgwick does not even mention this question either in book 4 or in book 2. In the latter, especially in chapter 3, 
he refers to the heterogeneity of preferences as a source of errors in interpersonal comparisons. These are necessary 
to the “egoistic hedonist” to evaluate the value of future states of happiness of which he or she has no direct 
experience. However, “we have sufficient evidence of the striking differences between the feelings produced in 
different men by similar causes” (Sidgwick 1962, p. 148). According to Sidgwick, however, it is impossible to prove 
that the fact of preferring certain kinds of pleasure reveals a higher capacity for pleasure, or that a life devoted to 
certain kinds of pleasures is happier than another. Different preferences may result in equal happiness or unequal 
happiness according to cases, but no lifestyle is an undisputable sign of a happier condition. Here the question mixes 
with Mill’s qualitative approach. Significantly, Sidgwick attacks Plato in order to reveal a weakness of Mill’s 
argument: “On this ground Plato’s reason for claiming that the life of the Philosopher has more pleasure than that of 
the Sensualist is palpably inadequate. The philosopher, he argues, has tried both kinds of pleasure, sensual as well as 
intellectual, and prefers the delights of philosophic life; the sensualist ought therefore to trust his decision and follow 
his example. But who can tell that the philosopher’s constitution is not such as to render the enjoyments oc the 
senses, in his case, comparatively feeble? while on the other hand the sensualist’s mind may not be able to attain 
more than a thin shadow of the philosopher’s delights” (Ibid.). 
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2. Inegalitarian Hedonism and the Road to Eugenics 
From many points of view, the economist Francis Ysidro Edgeworth provides in New and 
Old Methods of Ethics (1877) and Mathematical Psychics (1881)233 the most sophisticated account of 
the hedonistic-utilitarian calculus before the “ordinal utility revolution” introduced by the works 
of Pareto (1906; 1909) and Slutsky (1915). Edgeworth builds on the tradition going from 
Bentham to Mill, Sidgwick and Jevons (1971). From the latter, in particular, he derives the tools 
of marginalist analysis, but he does not limit his study to the “economic calculus”: he also 
examines the elements of the “utilitarian calculus” enshrined in the Greatest Happiness Principle. 
The latter is defined in Mathematical Psychics in the most enlarged way as “the greatest possible 
sum-total of pleasure summed through all time over all sentience”.234 
But the main novelty of Edgeworth’s contribution is not the application of a rigorous 
mathematical apparatus to the “felicific calculus”. As highlighted by David Levy and Sandra Peart 
(2004), Edgeworth was instrumental to introducing into economics and ethics the inegalitarian 
and eugenic implications of evolutionary theory. Indeed, as underscored by a review of New and 
Old Methods of Ethics (Anonymous 1878), his attempt consisted more precisely in trying to 
reconcile Alfred Barratt’s (1877, 1878) case for egoism and “struggle for existence” with 
Sidgwick’s universalistic hedonism. 
The aim of Edgeworth’s effort is unmistakably stated in the Preface of Mathematical 
Psychics: 
 
Mathematical reasonings are employed partly to confirm Mr. Sidgwick’s proof that Greatest 
Happiness is the end of right action; partly to deduce middle axioms, means conducive to that end. 
This deduction is of a very abstract, perhaps only negative, character; negativing the assumption 
that Equality is necessarily implied in Utilitarianism. For, if sentients differ in Capacity for happiness – 
under similar circumstances some classes of sentients experiencing on an average more pleasure 
(e.g. of imagination and sympathy) and less pain (e.g. of fatigue) than others – there is no 
presumption that equality of circumstances is the most felicific arrangement; especially when 
account is taken of the interest of posterity.235  
 
The case against distributive equality is based on the assumption of unequal capacity for 
pleasure not only among different species, but also within the human species. Coupled with this 
assumption, impartiality then requires unequal distribution of the means of happiness. 
Let us briefly state the essential passages of Edgeworth’s argumentation. The quantitative 
approach expounded by Bentham in chapter IV of the Introduction and restated by Jevons236 in 
marginalist terms is here repeated: “Utility, as Professor Jevons says, has two dimensions, intensity 
and time. The unit in each dimension is the just perceivable increment”.237  
The next problem is represented by intra-personal and interpersonal comparisons of 
happiness. As to intra-personal comparisons, which are common in individual or ‘economical 
calculus’, Edgeworth – quoting Laplace – adopts the probabilistic approach later rediscovered by 
Harsanyi. 
                                                
233 See also Edgeworth (1879). 
234 Edgeworth 1881, vi. 
235 Edgeworth 1881, vii. 
236 1871, ch. 2 and 3. 
237 Edgeworth 1881, 7. Bentham’s definition of the unit of pleasures and pains is similarly based on the four 
“dimensions” of intensity, duration, remoteness and probability. Reasoning in arithmetic rather than infinitesimal 
terms, he first examines the divisibility of intensity. “The limit of the quantity of a pleasure in respect of intensity on 
the (var.: this) side of diminution – he argues – is a state of indifference (var.: insensibility)”. He then defines as 
“unity” such a “degree of intensity possessed by that pleasure which is the faintest of any that can be distinguished to 
be pleasure” (Baumgardt 1952, p. 555). Higher numbers represent higher degrees of intensity. He then repeats the 
same reasoning for duration and states that the limits of probability and remoteness are represented by certainty and 
presence respectively, pointing out that “the degrees of intensity and duration must be express’d by whole numbers: 
that of proximity and that of certainty by fractions” (Ibid., p. 556). 




The implied equation to each other of each minimum sensible is a first principle incapable of proof. 
It resembles the equation to each other of undistinguishable events or cases, which constitutes the 
first principle of the mathematical calculus of belief. It is doubtless a principle acquired in the 
course of evolution. The implied equatability of time-intensity units, irrespective of distance in 
time and kind of pleasure, is still imperfectly evolved. Such is the unit of economical calculus.238 
 
Considering then the interpersonal comparisons required by the “moral calculus”, Edgeworth 
introduces the principle of equal consideration of interests: 
 
In virtue of what unit is such comparison possible? It is here submitted: Any individual 
experiencing a unit of pleasure-intensity during a unit of time is to “count for one”. Utility, then, 
has three dimensions; a mass of utility, “lot of pleasure” is greater than another when it has more 
intensity-time-number units. The third dimension is doubtless an evolutional acquisition; and is still 
far from perfectly evolved.239 
 
There is no difference at this level between Bentham and Mill on one side and Edgeworth 
on the other. For him too, impartiality means anonymity and equiproportionality. The principle 
takes here the following shape: every individual who experiences a unit of intensity times a unit 
of duration counts for one and no more than one; those who experience multiples of these units 
count in proportion to the quantities they feel. Moreover, impartiality is considered a 
consequence of the utilitarian rule. When Edgeworth refers to evolution in the passage above 
quoted, he means that the human species is spontaneously evolving towards Sidgwick’s 
“universal hedonism”, gradually learning to transcend self-preference. The present state of 
“impure utilitarianism” is placed halfway between the pure universalistic method and pure 
egoism: a state in which “the happiness of others as compared by the agent (in a calm moment) 
with his own, neither counts for nothing, nor yet ‘counts for one’, but counts for a fraction”.240 
There is however an important discontinuity in Edgeworth’s analysis: impartiality 
concerns the equality between “atoms of pleasure”241 but does not presuppose an equal capacity 
for pleasure. The importance of this distinction is revealed by the rest of Edgeworth’s reasoning. 
After examining competitive market equilibriums as “settlements” between utility-maximising 
egoistic individuals, the author considers the evolution of market society: the increasing number 
of combinations, monopolies and cooperatives, reducing the number of competitors, amplifies 
the indeterminateness of market settlements and produces a decline in the “reverence for 
competition”.242 In such a situation: “There would arise a general demand for a principle of 
arbitration”.243 Edgeworth imagines that individuals would unsatisfactorily try different arbitrary 
principles of justice until they “agree to commute their chance of any of the arrangements for the 
certainty of one of them, which has certainly distinguishing features and peculiar attractions as 
above described – the utilitarian arrangement”.244 Remarkably, utilitarian ethics is presented as a 
consequence of rational choice. 
This reasoning introduces to the second part of Mathematical Psychics devoted to the 
“Utilitarian Calculus”. This part examines the distribution of the means of happiness deriving 
from the Greatest Happiness Principle and the assumption of unequal capacity for happiness. 
Some definitions provide the framework of analysis: 
                                                
238 Ibid.: 7. See also Ibid., p. 60. 
239 Ibid., p. 8. 
240 Ibid., p. 16. 
241 Ibid., p. 8. 
242 Ibid., p. 50. 
243 Ibid., p. 51. 
244 Ibid., p. 55. 
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a. The hedonistic approach is precisely defined: “Pleasure is used for ‘preferable feeling’ in 
general”, and “The term includes absence of pain. Greatest possible happiness is the greatest 
possible integral of the differential ‘Number of enjoyers X duration of enjoyment X 
degree thereof”’.245  
b. The means of happiness are “wealth as destined for consumption and (what is 
conceivable if not usual in civilisation) the unpurchased command of unproductive 
labour”.246 
c. There are different capacities for happiness: “An individual has greater capacity for 
happiness than another, when for the same amount whatsoever of means he obtains a 
greater amount of pleasure, and also for the same increment (to the same amount) 
whatsoever of means a greater increment of pleasure”.247 The first condition, constantly 
higher average utility, stipulates that the utility curves of two individuals never cross.248 
The second condition, higher marginal utility, is essential to assess the distribution of the 
means of happiness, as explained below (see Appendix, Figure 1).  
Edgeworth is aware of an objection based on Bentham’s argument of the heterogeneity 
of preferences: an individual may have a higher desire of certain pleasures, but a lower desire of 
other pleasures. This seems to be the general case. However, Edgeworth assumes that general 
differences of capacity are not impossible: “But if one individual has the advantages in respect of 
most and the greatest pleasures, he may be treated as having more capacity for pleasure in 
general”.249 
Barratt had raised a second objection. Ignoring that the source of Millian “superior 
pleasures” is a spiritual one, he had examined the relationship between material means in general 
and these pleasures, concluding that there is no proportionality, “so that the problem as stated is 
only a small portion of the real problem of producing a total maximum surplus of pleasure”.250 
Comparing the relation to the same material means of a person enjoying superior pleasures 
(Mill’s “Socrates”) and of another enjoying only the pleasures deriving from these means (Mills’ 
“fool”), Edgeworth acknowledged that their marginal utility could be higher for the latter than 
for the former and that, paradoxically, the “fool” should receive more in their distribution (see 
Appendix, Figure 3).251 But again, Edgeworth concludes that the solution is more complex but 
not impossible. 
More in general, Edgeworth uses superior pleasures to prove that different capacities for 
happiness exist, can be empirically ascertained, and must be appropriately weighed in the felicific 
calculus. Replying to Lesilie Stephen, who had argued that if we adopt a moral principle 
according to which “we have no more reason for assigning special importance to the judgment of 
one man than to that of any other, or of preferring the estimate of the saint to the estimate of the 
sinner, the standard which results from the average judgment must be an inferior or debasing 
                                                
245 Ibid., pp. 56-7. 
246 Ibid., p. 57. 
247 Ibid. 
248 Edgeworth is conscious that this condition is highly unrealistic, although he believes that it can positively become 
valid with evolution: “This ‘definition of a thing’ is doubtless (like Euclid’s) imperfectly realised. One imperfection is 
that some individuals may enjoy the advantages not for any amount of means, but only for values above a certain 
amount. This may be the case with the higher orders of evolution” (Edgeworth 1881, p. 57). See Appendix, Figure 2. 
249 Ibid. 
250 Barratt 1878, p. 282n. 
251 “If ‘the higher pleasures, such as those of affection and virtue, can hardly be said to come from pleasure-stuff at 
all’ (as Mr Barratt says in his able note in “Mind X.”, often cited below), it is possible (though not probable?) that the 
enjoyers of the higher pleasures should derive from the zero, or rather a certain minimum, of means (and à fortiori for 
all superior values) an amount of pleasure greater than another class of enjoyers, say the sensual, can obtain for any 
amount whatsoever of means; while at the same time the sensual obtain grater increments of pleasure for the same 
increment of means (above the minimum)” (Ibid., pp. 57-8). 
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standard”,252 he argues: 
 
But it is no part of the utilitarian first principle that the happiness of each sentient shall “count for 
one” irrespective of that tendency to be reproduced and multiplied and spread which is the 
attribute of “refined” pleasures. The feeling of the brute, like the opinion of the fool, should 
count indeed, but count for little.253 
 
Thus Edgeworth answers the objection that Bentham had raised about the practical 
impossibility of demonstrating the existence of different dispositions to pleasure and pain.  
Referring to contemporary psychological research, he enthusiastically concludes that 
“greater precision might be attainable by improved examinations and hedonimetry”.254 As to 
William Thompson’s objection that different capacities are the result of unequal distribution, his 
answer is clear-cut: “The second objection, William Thompson’s, would hardly now be 
maintained in face of what is known about heredity”.255 In contrast to Mill, Edgeworth connects 
the ability to enjoy superior pleasures to heredity rather than to education and social 
development. 
Further definitions are the following: 
d. There are different capacities for work, i.e. different abilities to resist fatigue.256 
e. “Pleasure is measurable, and all pleasures are commensurable”.257 
f. The units of pleasure are identical in all individuals 
g. Marginal utility is decreasing. 
Under these assumptions, Edgeworth proposes to solve the following problem: 
 
PROBLEM. – To find (α) the distribution of means and (β) of labour, the (γ) quality and (δ) 
number of population, so that there may be the greatest possible happiness.258 
 
Avoiding technicalities, the solution to this problem can be reduced to four elements: 
1. Assuming that every individual does the same quantity of work, that everybody already 
possesses the quantity of means corresponding to the degree zero of happiness, and 
that this quantity is the same for all, every successive unit of a distribuendum will be 
allocated to the individual who receives the higher utility from it; therefore the first one 
to an individual belonging to the class with higher capacity for pleasure, then the second 
one to another individual of the same class, etc. Further doses will be distributed to 
members of “inferior” classes only when the marginal utility of those going to the 
superior classes falls below theirs. The conclusion is clearly inegalitarian: “Thus the 
distribution of means as between the equally capable of pleasure is equality; and generally is such that 
the more capable of pleasure shall have more means and more pleasure”. 259 
2. As to the distribution of labour, it “is deduced by a parity of reason from the parallel 
second axiom: that the rate of increase of fatigue increases as the work done increases”.260 
                                                
252 Stephen 1882, p. 358. 
253 Edgeworth 1882, pp. 446-7. 
254 Edgeworth 1881, p. 58. 
255 Ibid., p. 59. 
256 Ibid. 
257 Ibid. 
258 Ibid., p. 56. 
259 Ibid., p. 64. Edgeworth (1891b, pp. 16-17) criticises Mill for affirming, rather demonstrating, that equality derives 
from the principle of equal consideration of interests. He praises instead Bentham and Sidgwick (1891) for 
“deducting the equal distribution of wealth from the principle of greatest happiness combined with the law of 
diminishing utility, to use Jevons’ phrase; or what Bentham calls, in a passage quoted by Dr. Sidgwick, the 
‘pathological propositions upon which the good of equality is founded”’ Edgeworth 1891b, p. 17).  
260 Ibid., p. 65. Edgeworth acknowledges Barratt for calling attention to this point. In Edgeworth (1878) only the 
distribution of means of happiness was contemplated. In his review article, Barratt had indeed suggested that “ [...] 
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Therefore: “Who shall do the first increment of work? Of course, one of the most 
capable of work. And so on. The distribution of labour as between the equally capable of work is 
equality, and generally is such that the most capable of work shall do more work – so much more 
work, as to suffer more fatigue”.261 Also the distribution of labour is unequal. The 
consequences of this postulate are more vividly explained by Barratt: high and low 
capacities for pleasure and pain generally go together. Higher resistance to fatigue is the 
same as low capacity for pain. Therefore, “the answer to the problem, supposing the 
capacity for pleasure and pain to be constant, would be that the labour must be 
concentrated as much as possible, or at least up to a certain limit, and the means of 
pleasure applied first in alleviating the pain of labour, and then equally divided; and 
supposing the capacity to vary, those who have the least capacity should be made to do 
the work, and the pleasure-stuff after paying a certain amount of wages to the workers, 
should go to those who have the greatest capacity for pleasure”.262 
3. Unequal distribution is not only limited to satisfaction of actual wants. It must also 
promote the quality of population through selective education: given that “capacity for 
pleasure and capacity for work generally go together; [and] that they both rise with 
evolution”, it ensues that: “The quality of population should be the highest possible evolution”.263 
Scarce means of education must be allocated in the most efficient way: “For it is 
probable that the highest in the order of evolution are most capable of education and 
improvement. In the general advance, the most advanced should advance most”.264 It 
may be observed that in this passage Edgeworth unawares shifts from different 
capacities for happiness to different capacities for understanding.  
4. Assuming then the Malthusian principle of population and the increasing scarcity of 
means of subsistence, two further postulates are added, suggesting that eugenic 
practices maximise the well-being of future generations: “The fifth postulate appropriate 
to this case is that to substitute in one generation for any number of parents an equal 
number each superior in capacity (evolution) is beneficial for the next generation. This 
being granted [...] it is deduced that the average issue shall be as large as possible for all 
sections above a determinate degree of capacity, but zero for all sections below that 
degree”.265 And the “sixth postulate might be: To substitute in one generation for any 
number of parents and equal number each superior in capacity (evolution) is beneficial 
for all time. This postulate being granted, if possible let the most beneficial selection be 
not total. Then a total selection can be arranged more beneficial!”.266 Among the 
“mitigations” envisaged for the “not selected”, Edgeworth mentions Galton’s “celibate 
monasteries” and “emigration from Utopia to some unprogressive country where the 
prospect of happiness might be comparatively zero”.267 
 
Concluding his analysis, Edgeworth concedes that:  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
pain-stuff, or labour, as well as pleasure-stuff, must be included in the distribuend”. But he had added that “if the 
problem as modified be ‘to make such a distribution as to produce a maximum surplus of pleasure over pain’, the 
conclusion reached is favourable to Egoism”, which Barratt equates to “struggle for existence” (Barratt 1878, p. 282). 
261 Ibid., p. 66. 
262 Barratt 1878, p. 282. 
263 Edgeworth 1881, p. 68. 
264 Ibid. 
265 Ibid., p. 70 
266 Ibid., p. 71. 
267 Ibid., p. 72. 
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In fact, the happiness of some of the lower classes may be sacrificed to that of the higher classes. 
And, again, the happiness of part of the second generation may be sacrificed to that of the 
succeeding generations.268 
 
The only certitude is that:  
 
[...] the required limit is above the starving point; both because in the neighbourhood of that 
point there would be no work done, and, – before that consideration should come into force and 
above it – because the pleasures of the most favoured could not weigh much against the 
privations of the least favoured.269 
 
Edgeworth demonstrates that assuming unequal capacities for happiness in a hedonistic 
framework and applying to ethical evaluations the Greatest Happiness Principle, inequality is 
recommended as such, i.e. as a direct means to maximise total utility, not as an expedient 
instrumentally necessary to generate happiness – for example by increasing security, as Bentham 
had suggested.270 He then concludes: 
 
The end of action being defined as above, The Jacobin ideal “All equal and rude’’, J.S. Mill’s ideal 
“All equal and cultivated”, are not necessarily desirable, not paramount ends to be sought by 
revolution or the more tedious method of depopulation. Pending a scientific hedonimetry, the 
principle “Every man, and every woman, to count for one”, should be very cautiously applied. In 
communistic association (if such should be) the distribution of produce should be rather upon the 
principle of Fourier than of Owen. Universal equal suffrage is less likely to be approved than 
plural votes conferred not only (as Mill thought) upon sagacity, but also upon capacity for 
happiness.271 
 
In a single passage, Bentham’s democratic ideal is discarded reversing the argument he 
had employed, Mill’s plural vote, and more generally his “qualitative hedonism”, receive an 
inegalitarian interpretation that Mill himself would have repudiated, and finally, substantive 
equality is radically separated from impartiality and discarded as a means to increase the general 
and perspective happiness of societies.  
Thus, if the principle of equal consideration of individual happiness is combined with the 
assumption of unequal capacity for happiness, it implies only an equal consideration of the units 
of pleasure and pain in different individuals, not that of their overall happiness. According to 
Mill, Bentham’s dictum, “everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one” was 
tantamount to arguing that “equal amounts of happiness are equally desirable”.272 Edgeworth 
suggests instead that: 
 
                                                
268 Ibid., p. 74. 
269 Ibid., p. 75. 
270 Equality “is deducible from the practical principle of exact Utilitarianism combined with the simple laws of 
sentience [...] But Equality is not the whole of distributive justice. There may be needed an αξία for unequal 
distribution. Now inequalities of fortune – abstracted the cases of governor and general and every species of trustee 
for the advantage of others – are generally explained by utilitarians as the consequence of conventions clear and 
fixed and preventing confusion and encouraging production, but not otherwise desirable, or rather of which the 
necessity is regretted. Yet in the minds of many good men among the moderns and the wisest of the ancient, there 
appears a deeper sentiment in favour of aristocratical privilege – the privilege of man above brute, of civilised above 
savage, of birth, of talent, and of the male sex. This sentiment of right has a ground of utilitarianism in supposed 
differences of capacity. Capacity for pleasure is a property of evolution an essential attribute of civilisation” 
(Edgeworth 1881, p. 77). 
271 Ibid., p. 81. 
272 Mill 1861a, p. 258n. 
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Not “everybody to count for one,” but “every just perceivable increment of pleasure to count for 
one,” or some such definition of the pleasure unit, is the utilitarian principle of distribution.273 
 
3. The Embarrassment of Differences 
Edgeworth’s Mathematical Psychics was reviewed by the two major British economists of 
the time, Jevons and Marshall.  
Jevons, ignoring the economic arguments discussed in the first part of that work, entirely 
focuses on the part devoted to “Utilitarian Calculus”. His analysis, however, is quite 
disappointing. Jevons limits himself to summarising Edgeworth’s arguments and adds no 
comment. He stresses “such empirical bases as Fechner’s law, Wundt’s curve of pleasure and 
pain, or Delboeuf’s formulae”,274 and repeats the inegalitarian conclusions derived by Edgeworth. 
The reticence of his account is well illustrated by the following diplomatic comment: “The 
general tendency of Mr. Edgeworth’s philosophy is towards a hierarchy of social ranks rather 
than rigid equality”.275 More than on theoretical arguments, which might appear embarrassing to 
him, Jevons concentrates on the practical corollaries that Edgeworth derives from his analysis, 
such as the defence of inequality between sexes, the defence of the institution of marriage etc. the 
unaware reader is not able to understand whether these corollaries are based on original 
arguments or on traditional instrumental arguments about inequality. 
As to Marshall, his review is known especially for the remarks on economic methodology 
that the founder of the Cambridge school develops in it. He is especially interested in 
Edgeworth’s extensive use of mathematics, insisting that mathematical language should be 
translated “in language that is understanded of the people”.276 Concerning the part on utilitarian 
calculus, Marshall limits himself to some remarks on the link between different capacities for 
happiness and the Greatest Happiness Principle. The conclusion is sibylline: “Perhaps the 
problem which he attacks is incapable of a complete solution; but it may be safely that no one 
can read his discussion of it without profit”.277 
 
To find a careful discussion of the distributive problems related to the assumption of 
different capacities for happiness we must turn to a work written more than twenty years later by 
one of Marshall’s disciples, Arthur Cecil Pigou: this book is Wealth and Welfare (1912), a work that 
originated the branch of economic science known as Welfare Economics. Although the book 
makes frequent references to Edgeworth, the editor of The Economic Journal is not mentioned on 
this subject. 
Pigou’s book can be conceived as an attempt to provide an answer to Moore’s theory of 
“organic unities”. Pigou argues that his book is not on welfare in general but on economic 
welfare only, and that his attempt is based on the probabilistic assumption that an increase in the 
economic welfare of some members of society contributes to increasing general welfare. His 
theory is based on a series of “propositions” that recall Bentham’s “axioms of mental pathology”. 
The first proposition states “that, if a cause is introduced, which makes for an increase in the 
aggregate size of the dividend, provided that the absolute share of no group of members, in 
terms of the commodities which that group is accustomed chiefly to consume, decreases, the 
economic welfare of the community as a whole is likely to be augmented”.278 The second 
proposition introduces to the re-distribution of wealth with a view to increasing total welfare: 
“The most abstract form of it affirms that economic welfare is likely to be augmented by 
anything that, leaving other things unaltered, renders the distribution of the national dividend less 
                                                
273 Edgeworth 1881, p. 122. 
274 Jevons 1881, p. 581. 
275 Ibid., p. 582. 
276 Marshall 1881, p. 266. 
277 Ibid., p. 268. 
278 Pigou 1912, p. 20. 
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unequal”.279 Pigou immediately adds that this proposition rely on the assumption of “equal 
temperament” among all individuals. Under, this assumption, the case made by Bentham is 
shown to be limited to the case of two individuals only. Then, distributive equality is so 
generalised: 
 
If we assume all members of the community to be of equal temperament, and if these members 
are only two in number, it is easily shown that any transference from the richer to the poorer of 
the two, since it enables more intense wants to be satisfied at the expense of less intense wants, 
must increase the aggregate sum of satisfaction. In a community consisting of more than two 
members, the meaning of “rendering the distribution of the dividend less unequal” is ambiguous. 
On the assumption, however, of similarity of temperament among the members, it can be shown 
that a diminution in the inequality of distribution, in the sense of a diminution in the mean square 
deviation from the mean income, probably increases satisfaction 280 
 
From a theoretical viewpoint, Pigou accepts that if differences were always the result of 
unequal capacities for happiness they would be justified as a means to attain maximum total 
utility. His objections are of a factual kind: 
1. it can be hardly demonstrated that present inequalities are the result of unequal 
capacities for happiness rather than random results of social and historical 
conditions;281 
2. it is impossible to consider different capacities as the result of nature and heredity 
only, or even principally. Most of them are the result of education and capacities can 
be improved.282 Both Mill and Marshall283 are Pigou’s obvious sources of inspiration 
for this argument. 
It is therefore the generality of the argument that different capacities are innate that is 
challenged. If this assumption is removed, it can no longer be demonstrated that the four steps 
imagined by Edgeworth generate long-term maximisation of happiness. The educational and 
eugenic implications would be especially meaningless. 
This question is discussed more in details in Part I, Chapter IV, “The National Dividend 
and the Quality of the People”. What “Biometicians and Mendelians” object to welfare 
economics, argues Pigou, is that “Economists, it is said, in discussing, as I have done, the direct 
effect of the circumstances of the dividend upon welfare, are wasting their energies. The direct 
effect of these circumstances is of no significance; it is only their indirect effect on the size of the 
families of good and bad stocks respectively that really matters”.284  
                                                
279 Ibid., p. 24. 
280 Ibid., p. 24-5. There is a third proposition that should be considered for completeness sake. “This may be 
expressed roughly by saying that, if a cause is introduced which diminishes the variability, or inequality in time, of the 
dividend, and especially of that part of it which accrues to the poorer classes, the economic welfare of the 
community as a whole is likely to be augmented” (Pigou 1912, p. 32). This proposition has obvious implications for 
anti-cyclical economic policies which are discussed in Part IV of the book. 
281 “Extreme poverty is, no doubt, often the result of feckless character, physical infirmity, and other ‘bad’ qualities 
of finished persons. But, these themselves are generally correlated with bad environment; and it is ridiculous to treat 
as unworthy of argument the suggestion that the ‘bad’ qualities are mainly the result, not of bad original property, but 
of bad original environment” (Ibid., p. 64). 
282 “No doubt, the inequalities which this proposition condemns are random inequalities. The condemnation would 
not hold good, if such inequalities of income as existed were always arranged in accordance with capacity for 
obtaining enjoyment from economic resources. This consideration may not impossibly justify the claim that certain 
specified inequalities between races or groups ought not to be abolished; though it must be remembered even here that, 
since capacity for enjoyment depends largely upon education in it, groups or races of little capacity under present 
conditions are not thereby proved to be inherently of little capacity” (Ibid., p. 26). 
283 Marshall’s notion of “standard of life” – “that standard of which the rise implies an ‘increase of intelligence, and 
energy, and self-respect”’ – is cautiously mentioned by Edgeworth (1891a, p. 14), as one of the elements of a 
“cheerful doctrine” which claims that “improved organisation tends to diminish or even ovverride any increased 
resistance which Nature may offer to raising increased amount of raw produce”. 
284 Pigou 1912, p. 52. 
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Pigou’s reply is composed of three parts. Firstly, he argues that Eugenic policies cannot be 
carried too far, since it is impossible to measure all differences of capacity. He agrees however 
that for extreme defects (such as insanity and particular criminal attitudes) they could be justified. 
However, this has nothing to do with economics. 
Secondly, quoting Sidney Webb’s argument put at the beginning of this paper, he 
contends that ‘too exclusive attention to the biological aspect of social problems’ would be an 
error,285 for the natural quality of people forms only a part, if one, of what is necessary to produce 
a happy society. His criticism, however, goes deeper than this. Considering again the objection 
that working on social and economic conditions “affect the persons immediately subjected to 
them”, but cannot “influence the inborn quality of succeeding generations”, he replies that 
 
[...] the environment of one generation can produce a lasting result, because it can affect the 
environment of future generations. Environments, in short, as well as people, have children. 
Though education and so forth cannot influence new births in the physical world, they can 
influence them in the world of ideas; and ideas, once produced or once accepted by a particular 
generation, whether or not they can be materialised into mechanical inventions, may remodel from 
its very base the environment which succeeding generations enjoy. In this way a permanent change 
of environment is brought about, and, since environment is admitted to have an important 
influence on persons actually subjected to it, such a change may obviously produce enduring 
consequences.286 
 
This notion of society as an institutional and historical construction through the 
objectification and “accumulation”287 of knowledge and inventions is again indebted to Mill and 
Marshall. “Progress”, concludes Pigou, “not merely permanent but growing, can be brought 
about by causes with which breeding and gametes have nothing to do”.288 
Thirdly, and finally, Pigou discusses the argument that redistributive policies, improving 
the condition of the poor, may in the long run favour the survival of the “bad stock”. His reply 
consists of two arguments: firstly, if weakness is accidental, the children of the weak may be 
strong; and secondly, improving economic welfare “also removes influences that make for the 
weakening of the fit. The total effect of this twofold action may well be beneficial rather than 
injurious”.289 
The interest of Pigou’s contribution lies therefore in the fact that he never sceptically 
assumes equal capacities for happiness, like Bentham and implicitly Mill had done, nor, like 
Edgeworth, does he enthusiastically believe in the scientific demonstrability of genetic differences 
in capacity. He admits the possibility of natural inequalities and in some extreme cases he even 
recommends eugenic policies, but he argues that there are many other solid reasons in favour of 
an equal consideration of individual interests and of a more equal distribution of the means of 
happiness and education.290 
 
 
The principle of equal consideration of interests, both in the meaning of equal 
consideration of the most important human interests291 and in the equiprobability approach 
suggested by Harsanyi, continues to be considered a pillar of utilitarian ethics. Though “a purely 
                                                
285 Ibid., p. 58. 
286 Ibid., pp. 58-9. 
287 The notion of progress as “scientific accumulation” had been developed by the Italian economist Melchiorre 
Gioja, whose contribution is acknowledged by Charles Babbage in On the Economy of Machienry and Manufactures. See 
Guidi (2005). 
288 Ibid., p. 61. 
289 Ibid., p. 62. 
290 Significantly, but quite paradoxically, Pigou’s cautious acceptance of the possibility of different capacities is taken by 
Edgeworth as a confirmation of his inegalitarian theory. See Edgeworth (1913, p. 181-2). 
291 Singer 1993, p. 23. 
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formal principle”,292 it is generally used to underpin the ceteris paribus favourable view that 
utilitarians have of substantive equality. 
The study of classical utilitarianism from Bentham to Pigou, who grounded utilitarianism 
on a hedonistic foundation, has revealed many implications of this principle that may still be 
considered in contemporary debate. 
Firstly, this principle cannot be inferred from statements of fact and has the nature of a 
true ethical principle. 
Secondly, it is strictly connected to the Utility Principle, not because it lacks an 
independent ethical content, but because the Greatest Happiness Principle implies it in its nature 
of universalistic rule of action. 
Thirdly, this principle only requires that “equal amounts of happiness (or interests in a 
broader sense) are equally desirable”. It does not necessarily imply an equal distribution of the 
“means of happiness”. In order to pass from equal consideration of interests to distributive 
equality we have to make stronger assumptions. In a hedonistic framework the simplest required 
assumption is equal capacity for happiness. But also in non-hedonistic forms of utilitarianism the 
problem of different capacities, either genetic or acquired, has to be carefully assessed.293 
Fourthly, the answers that utilitarian philosophers and economists gave to the hypothesis 
of different capacities for happiness reveal many important arguments in favour of equality: the 
heterogeneity of human qualities and desires and the impossibility of ranking them along a single 
scale of capacity, the practical unfeasibility of separating hereditary from acquired diversities, the 
cumulative benefits resulting from social institutions that favour equality and enhance the 
“standard of life” of all, the importance of education. 
                                                
292 Ibid., p. 22. 
293 Ibid., p. 26-38. 





The figures traced below try to provide a representation of Edgeworth’s arguments about the 
unequal distribution of capacities for happiness. 
 












This graph represents the utility functions of two individuals A and B, respectively Ua e Ub. We 
observe that for whatever point on Ua, both average utility (tgθ’) and marginal utility (tgη’) are 
higher. The slope of Ua is higher than that Ub. This implies that A’s saturation point is reached 
for a higher quantity than B’s.  
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In this case, for quantities lower than Q*, both B’s average and marginal utilities are higher than 
A’s, and vice versa for quantities higher than Q*. 
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This graph describes the case made by Edgeworth. Superior and inferior pleasures are analysed as 
a function of the same material good. This good generates an inferior pleasure in individual B 
and a superior pleasure in individual A. This may be explained by a sort of complementarity 
between this material good and the source of the superior pleasure. Suppose that Socrates takes 
superior pleasure by teaching philosophy to his disciples. To do this, he needs minimum food 
and shelter. But he is content with little, for he does not care for these goods for their own sake 
but only as means to obtain the superior pleasure. At the same time, “to be content with little” 
means that small quantities of food and shelter give him high pleasure, since they allow him to 
teach philosophy.  
Consistently with Mill, Edgeworth assumes that superior pleasures are higher than the pleasures 
deriving from whatever quantity of sources of inferior pleasures. As clarified by Arrhenius and 
Rabinowicz (2005), this implies that satiety (V) is reached for a level of utility that is lower than 
that produced by superior pleasures. After a “certain minimum” Qmin, however, and until V, the 
marginal utility that individual B obtains from inferior pleasures is higher than that enjoyed by A. 
Socrates is satisfied with a small amount of material means, since his mind is only interested in 
superior pleasures, while the pig is eager of having more of these material means. 
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